(بَابٌ) هُوَ فِي الْعُرْفِ مَعْرُوفٌ وَفِي اللُّغَةِ فُرْجَةٌ فِي سَاتِرٍ يُتَوَصَّلُ بِهَا مِنْ دَاخِلٍ إلَى خَارِجٍ وَعَكْسُهُ حَقِيقَةٌ فِي الْأَجْسَامِ كَبَابِ الدَّارِ مَجَازٌ فِي الْمَعَانِي كَبَابِ الطَّهَارَةِ وَفِي الِاصْطِلَاحِ اسْمٌ لِطَائِفَةٍ مِنْ الْمَسَائِلِ مُشْتَرَكَةٍ فِي حُكْمٍ وَالْبَابُ فِي كَلَامِ الْمُؤَلِّفِ إمَّا مَرْفُوعٌ مُبْتَدَأٌ خَبَرُهُ مَحْذُوفٌ أَوْ خَبَرٌ لِمُبْتَدَأٍ مَحْذُوفٍ أَوْ مَنْصُوبٌ بِفِعْلٍ مَحْذُوفٍ أَوْ مَوْقُوفٌ عَلَى حَدِّ مَا قِيلَ فِي الْأَعْدَادِ الْمَسْرُودَةِ وَاعْتُرِضَ الْإِعْرَابُ الْأَوَّلُ بِأَنَّهُ يَلْزَمُ عَلَيْهِ الِابْتِدَاءُ بِالنَّكِرَةِ وَيُجَابُ بِأَنَّ الْمُسَوِّغَ لِلِابْتِدَاءِ هُنَا وُقُوعُ الْخَبَرِ جَارًّا وَمَجْرُورًا، وَهُوَ إذَا وَقَعَ خَبَرًا عَنْ نَكِرَةٍ وَجَبَ تَقْدِيمُهُ عَلَيْهَا لِيَسُوغَ الِابْتِدَاءُ بِهَا فَهُوَ هُنَا يُقَدَّرُ مُقَدَّمًا عَلَيْهَا وَاعْلَمْ أَنَّهُ قَدْ اخْتَلَفَ مَقَاصِدُ الْفُقَهَاءِ وَالْمُحَدِّثِينَ فِيمَا يَبْتَدِئُونَ بِهِ كُتُبَهُمْ بِحَسَبِ اخْتِلَافِ أَغْرَاضِهِمْ فِيمَا قَصَدُوا تَبْيِينَهُ مِنْ أَحْكَامِ الشَّرِيعَةِ الْمُتَعَلِّقَةِ بِأَعْمَالِ الْقُلُوبِ وَهِيَ الِاعْتِقَادَاتُ الْمُسَمَّاةُ بِأُصُولِ الدِّينِ وَأَعْمَالُ الْجَوَارِحِ الظَّاهِرَةِ الْمُسَمَّاةُ بِالْفُرُوعِ
(Bāb [Chapter/Gate]) In common usage (ʿurf), it is well-known. In language (lughah), it is an opening in a barrier through which one passes from inside to outside and vice versa. It is literal (ḥaqīqah) in the case of physical objects, like the door of a house, and metaphorical (majāz) in the case of concepts, like the Chapter of Purification. In technical terminology (iṣṭilāḥ), it is a name for a group of issues (masāʾil) that share a common ruling. And the word “Bāb” in the author’s speech is either in the nominative case (marfūʿ) as a subject (mubtadaʾ) whose predicate is elided, or a predicate for an elided subject, or in the accusative case (manṣūb) due to an elided verb, or uninflected (mawqūf) according to what has been said regarding serially listed numbers. The first grammatical analysis was objected to on the grounds that it necessitates beginning a sentence with an indefinite noun. The response is that the justification for beginning [with an indefinite noun] here is the predicate being a preposition and its object (jārr wa majrūr), and when it occurs as a predicate for an indefinite noun, it must be placed before it to justify beginning with it. So here, it is considered to be placed before it. And know that the intentions of the jurists (fuqahāʾ) and the hadith scholars (muḥaddithīn) have differed regarding what they begin their books with, according to the difference in their objectives concerning what they intended to clarify of the rulings of the Sharīʿah related to the actions of the hearts—which are the beliefs, called the Foundations of the Religion (Uṣūl al-Dīn)—and the actions of the external limbs, called the Branches (al-Furūʿ).
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[حاشية العدوي]
[Commentary of al-ʿAdawī]
الْخُطْبَةِ وَالْحَمْدُ لِلَّهِ الْكَرِيمِ الْوَهَّابِ وَهَّابِ الْعَطَايَا وَمُسَبِّبِ الْأَسْبَابِ نَتَوَسَّلُ إلَيْك بِجَاهِ الْحَبِيبِ أَنْ تُبَلِّغَ الْمَقَاصِدَ عَنْ قَرِيبٍ فَإِنَّك قَرِيبٌ مُجِيبٌ.
[From] the introduction: And praise be to Allah, the Generous, the Bestower, the Bestower of gifts and the Causer of causes. We beseech You by the status of the Beloved to make us reach our objectives soon, for You are indeed Near, Responsive.
[بَابُ الطَّهَارَةِ]
[Chapter of Purification]
(بَابُ الطَّهَارَةِ) (قَوْلُهُ بَابٌ) قَالَ ابْنُ مَحْمُودٍ شَارِحُ أَبِي دَاوُد وَقَدْ اُسْتُعْمِلَتْ هَذِهِ اللَّفْظَةُ زَمَنَ التَّابِعِينَ ذَكَرَهُ الْمُنَاوِيُّ
(Chapter of Purification) (His statement: Bāb) Ibn Maḥmūd, the commentator on Abū Dāwūd, said: “This word was used in the time of the Tābiʿīn.” Al-Munāwī mentioned this.
(قَوْلُهُ هُوَ فِي الْعُرْفِ مَعْرُوفٌ) ، وَهُوَ الْجِسْمُ الْمَعْرُوفُ الْمُرَكَّبُ مِنْ خَشَبٍ وَمِنْ مَسَامِيرَ وَقَوْلُهُ وَفِي اللُّغَةِ إلَخْ فَإِذَنْ الْخَشَبُ الْمَعْرُوفُ لَا يُقَالُ فِيهِ لُغَةً بَابٌ
(His statement: In common usage, it is well-known), and that is the known object composed of wood and nails. And his statement: “And in language…” etc., therefore, the known piece of wood is not linguistically called a “bāb”.
(قَوْلُهُ فِي الْأَجْسَامِ) أَيْ حَقِيقَةً لُغَوِيَّةً فِي دَاخِلِ الْأَجْسَامِ الَّذِي هُوَ الْفُرْجَةُ
(His statement: in the case of physical objects) meaning, a linguistic reality (ḥaqīqah lughawiyyah) within physical objects, which is the opening.
(قَوْلُهُ مَجَازٌ فِي الْمَعَانِي) مَجَازُ اسْتِعَارَةٍ بِأَنْ شَبَّهَ الْأَلْفَاظَ مِنْ حَيْثُ كَوْنُهَا يُتَوَصَّلُ بِهَا لِفَهْمِ الْمَعَانِي بِالْبَابِ الَّذِي هُوَ الْفُرْجَةُ وَاسْتُعِيرَ اسْمُ الْمُشَبَّهِ بِهِ لِلْمُشَبَّهِ وَالْقَرِينَةُ حَالِيَّةٌ وَأَرَادَ بِالْمَعْنَى مَا قَابَلَ الذَّاتَ فَيَصْدُقُ بِاللَّفْظِ، فَإِنَّهُ مَعْنَى أَيْ لَيْسَ بِذَاتٍ، وَلَيْسَ الْمُرَادُ بِالْمَعْنَى مَا قَابَلَ اللَّفْظَ وَقَوْلُهُ مَجَازٌ أَيْ لُغَةً فَلَا يُنَافِي أَنَّهُ صَارَ حَقِيقَةً عُرْفِيَّةً فِيهَا، وَهُوَ الْمُشَارَكَةُ بِقَوْلِهِ وَفِي الِاصْطِلَاحِ
(His statement: metaphorical in the case of concepts) A metaphor by borrowing (majāz istiʿārah), by which he likened the words—in that they are a means to reach the understanding of concepts—to the gate, which is the opening. The name of that which is used for comparison (al-mushabbah bih) was borrowed for that which is being compared (al-mushabbah), and the indicator (qarīnah) is contextual. And by “concept” (maʿnā), he intended what is opposite to a physical entity (dhāt), so it applies to the word, for it is a concept, i.e., not a physical entity. The intended meaning of “concept” is not what is opposite to the word. And his statement “metaphorical” means linguistically, so this does not contradict that it has become a customary reality (ḥaqīqah ʿurfiyyah) for them, which is the shared meaning indicated by his statement “And in technical terminology.”
(قَوْلُهُ مِنْ الْمَسَائِلِ) أَرَادَ بِهَا الْقَضَايَا الْمَخْصُوصَةَ الدَّالَّةَ عَلَى الْمَعَانِي الْمَخْصُوصَةِ لِمَا تَقَرَّرَ أَنَّ الْمَدْلُولَ لِلتَّرَاجِمِ إنَّمَا هُوَ اللَّفْظُ لَا الْمَعْنَى
(His statement: of issues) He intended by it the specific propositions that indicate specific concepts, because it has been established that what is indicated by chapter headings is the wording, not the meaning.
(قَوْلُهُ مُشْتَرَكَةٍ فِي حُكْمٍ) كَبَابِ الْوُضُوءِ فَالْقَضَايَا الدَّالَّةُ عَلَى فَرَائِضِ الْوُضُوءِ وَسُنَنِهِ وَمُسْتَحَبَّاتِهِ وَمَكْرُوهَاتِهِ مُشْتَرَكَةٌ فِي حُكْمٍ، وَهُوَ كَوْنُهَا مُتَعَلِّقَةً بِالْوُضُوءِ وَالْمُرَادُ مُشْتَرَكُ مَدْلُولِهَا كَمَا ظَهَرَ
(His statement: that share a common ruling) Like the chapter of ablution (wuḍūʾ). The propositions indicating the obligations of ablution, its sunnahs, its recommended acts, and its disliked acts share a common ruling, which is their being related to ablution. And what is meant is that their indicated meaning is shared, as is apparent.
(قَوْلُهُ وَالْبَابُ فِي كَلَامِ الْمُؤَلِّفِ) أَيْ لَا فِي كُلِّ مَوَاضِعِهِ هَذَا ظَاهِرُهُ، وَلَيْسَ كَذَلِكَ بَلْ فِي كُلِّ مَوَاضِعِهِ يَأْتِي فِي ذَلِكَ إلَّا أَنَّ الِاعْتِرَاضَ بِلُزُومِ الِابْتِدَاءِ بِالنَّكِرَةِ لَا يَأْتِي فِي مِثْلِ قَوْلِ الرِّسَالَةِ بَابُ مَا يَجِبُ مِنْهُ الْوُضُوءُ فَتَأَمَّلْ
(His statement: And the word “Bāb” in the author’s speech) Meaning, not in all its instances. This is its apparent meaning, but it is not so. Rather, in all its instances this [analysis] applies, except that the objection of necessitating beginning with an indefinite noun does not apply in the likes of the statement in the Risālah: “Bābu mā yajibu minhu al-wuḍūʾ” (The chapter of that which necessitates ablution). So reflect.
(قَوْلُهُ خَبَرُهُ مَحْذُوفٌ) أَيْ فِي الطَّهَارَةِ بَابٌ
(His statement: whose predicate is elided) Meaning, [the full phrase is] “Fī al-ṭahārati bābun” (In purification there is a chapter).
(قَوْلُهُ خَبَرٌ لِمُبْتَدَأٍ مَحْذُوفٍ) أَيْ هَذَا بَابٌ
(His statement: a predicate for an elided subject) Meaning, [the full phrase is] “Hādhā bābun” (This is a chapter).
(قَوْلُهُ أَوْ مَنْصُوبٌ بِفِعْلٍ مَحْذُوفٍ) وَيُقَالُ وَيُبْعِدُهُ الرَّسْمُ وَيُجَابُ بِأَنَّهُ عَلَى لُغَةِ رَبِيعَةَ
(His statement: or in the accusative case due to an elided verb) And it is said, “The orthography makes this unlikely,” and the response is that it is according to the dialect of Rabīʿah.
(قَوْلُهُ أَوْ مَوْقُوفٌ عَلَى حَدِّ مَا قِيلَ إلَخْ) أَيْ مَوْقُوفٌ لَا مُعْرَبٌ وَلَا مَبْنِيٌّ وَقَوْلُهُ عَلَى حَدِّ مَا قِيلَ أَيْ عَلَى طَرِيقَةٍ هِيَ مَا قِيلَ إلَخْ أَيْ أَنَّهَا مَوْقُوفَةٌ، وَقِيلَ مَبْنِيٌّ لِلشَّبَهِ الْإِهْمَالِيِّ، وَهِيَ أَنَّهَا عَامِلَةٌ وَلَا مَعْمُولَةٌ، وَأَمَّا دَعْوَى أَنَّهُ مَبْنِيٌّ وَكُسِرَ آخِرُهُ لِالْتِقَاءِ السَّاكِنَيْنِ فِي نَحْوِ بَابِ الطَّهَارَةِ فَفِيهِ نَظَرٌ إذْ لَا وَجْهَ لِبِنَائِهِ إلَّا أَنْ يُرَاعِيَ قَبْلَ التَّرْكِيبِ وَالْقَوْلَ بِالْبِنَاءِ حِينَئِذٍ
(His statement: or uninflected according to what has been said… etc.) Meaning, uninflected (mawqūf), neither inflected (muʿrab) nor fixed (mabnī). And his statement “according to what has been said” means according to the way that is what was said… etc. Meaning that they are uninflected. And it was said they are fixed due to the resemblance of being non-governing (al-shabah al-ihmālī), which is that they are governing but not governed. As for the claim that it is fixed and its ending is given a kasrah due to the meeting of two silent letters in the likes of “Bābi al-ṭahārah,” this is questionable, as there is no reason for it to be fixed unless one considers it before the construct state, and the opinion of it being fixed then [is weak].
(قَوْلُهُ وُقُوعُ الْخَبَرِ إلَخْ) فِي عِبَارَتِهِ تَنَافٍ، وَذَلِكَ؛ لِأَنَّهُ يُفِيدُ أَوَّلًا أَنَّ الْمُسَوِّغَ وُقُوعُ الْخَبَرِ جَارًّا وَمَجْرُورًا وَقَوْلُهُ وَجَبَ تَقْدِيمُهُ إلَخْ يُفِيدُ أَنَّ التَّقْدِيمَ هُوَ الْمُسَوَّغُ وَالتَّحْقِيقُ الْأَوَّلُ، وَهُوَ أَنَّ الْمُسَوِّغَ إنَّمَا هُوَ كَوْنُ الْخَبَرِ جَارًّا وَمَجْرُورًا وَالتَّقْدِيمُ إنَّمَا يُرْتَكَبُ؛ لِأَنَّهُ إذَا أَخَّرَهُ يُتَوَهَّمُ كَوْنُهُ نَعْتًا؛ لِأَنَّ طَلَبَ النَّكِرَةِ لِلنَّعْتِ طَلَبٌ حَثِيثٌ لِلتَّخْصِيصِ
(His statement: the predicate being… etc.) In his expression, there is a contradiction. That is because it first implies that the justification is the predicate being a preposition and its object. And his statement, “it must be placed before it…” etc., implies that the placement before is the justification. The correct view is the first one, which is that the justification is simply the predicate being a preposition and its object. The placement before is only resorted to because if it were placed after, it might be mistaken for an adjective (naʿt), because an indefinite noun has an urgent need for an adjective for specification.
(قَوْلُهُ فِيمَا يَبْتَدِئُونَ) أَيْ مَقَاصِدَهُمْ الْكَائِنَةَ فِي الشَّيْءِ الَّذِي يَبْتَدِئُونَ بِهِ كُتُبَهُمْ مِنْ ظَرْفِيَّةِ الْعَامِّ فِي الْخَاصِّ مَقْصُودًا ذَلِكَ الْخَاصُّ أَوْ فِي بِمَعْنَى مِنْ
(His statement: regarding what they begin) Meaning, their intentions existing in the thing with which they begin their books, from the perspective of the general containing the specific, with that specific thing being intended. Or, “fī” (in) has the meaning of “min” (from).
(قَوْلُهُ بِحَسَبِ) أَيْ بِاعْتِبَارِ وَالْبَاءُ لِلسَّبَبِيَّةِ مُتَعَلِّقٌ بِاخْتِلَافِ الْأَوَّلِ
(His statement: according to) Meaning, with consideration of. And the letter “bāʾ” is for causality, related to the first “difference” (ikhtilāf).
(قَوْلُهُ أَغْرَاضِهِمْ) أَيْ مَقَاصِدِهِمْ وَقَوْلُهُ فِيمَا قَصَدُوا إلَخْ مِنْ ظَرْفِيَّةِ الْعَامِّ فِي الْخَاصِّ مَقْصُودًا ذَلِكَ الْخَاصُّ مَا تَقَدَّمَ أَوْ فِي بِمَعْنَى مِنْ
(His statement: their objectives) Meaning, their intentions. And his statement “concerning what they intended…” etc. is from the perspective of the general containing the specific, with that specific thing being intended, as mentioned before. Or, “fī” (in) has the meaning of “min” (from).
(قَوْلُهُ مِنْ أَحْكَامِ الشَّرِيعَةِ) مِنْ بَيَانٌ لِمَا وَالْمُبَيَّنُ تِلْكَ الْأَحْكَامُ إمَّا بِاعْتِبَارِ ذَوَاتِهَا وَأَصْلِهَا أَوْ بِاعْتِبَارِهَا كُلِّهَا دُونَ أَصْلِهَا أَوْ بِاعْتِبَارِ بَعْضِهَا فَالْأَوَّلُ كَالْبُخَارِيِّ فَإِنَّهُ أَرَادَ التَّعَرُّضَ لَهَا، وَأَصْلُهَا نَاسَبَ الِابْتِدَاءَ بِالْأَصْلِ وَالثَّانِي كَابْنِ أَبِي زَيْدٍ فَإِنَّهُ لَمَّا أَرْدَاهَا كُلَّهَا دُونَ أَصْلِهَا لَمْ يَبْتَدِئْ بِالْأَصْلِ وَنَاسَبَ الِابْتِدَاءُ بِأُصُولِ الدِّينِ؛ لِأَنَّ الْفَرْعِيَّةَ مَبْنِيَّةٌ عَلَيْهِ وَالثَّالِثُ كَخَلِيلٍ فَإِنَّهُ أَرَادَ الْفَرْعِيَّةَ فَقَطْ فَلَمْ يُنَاسِبْ الِابْتِدَاءُ بِالْأَصْلِ وَلَا بِأُصُولِ الدِّينِ وَنَاسَبَ الِابْتِدَاءُ بِمَا اقْتَضَى الْمَقَامُ عِنْدَ كُلِّ الِابْتِدَاءِ بِهِ كَمَا تَبَيَّنَ فَتَدَبَّرْ، وَالْإِضَافَةُ لِلْبَيَانِ أَيْ أَحْكَامٌ هِيَ الشَّرِيعَةُ
(His statement: of the rulings of the Sharīʿah) The “min” is explanatory for “mā” (what). And what is being explained are those rulings, either with respect to their essences and their foundation, or with respect to all of them without their foundation, or with respect to some of them. The first is like al-Bukhārī, for he intended to address them and their foundation, so it was suitable to begin with the foundation. The second is like Ibn Abī Zayd, for since he intended all of them without their foundation, he did not begin with the foundation, and it was suitable to begin with the Foundations of the Religion (Uṣūl al-Dīn) because the branches (al-farʿiyyah) are built upon it. The third is like Khalīl, for he intended only the branches, so it was not suitable to begin with the foundation nor with the Foundations of the Religion, and it was suitable to begin with what the context of each required beginning with, as has been clarified. So ponder. And the possessive construction (iḍāfah) is for clarification, meaning, rulings that are the Sharīʿah.
(قَوْلُهُ بِأَعْمَالِ الْقُلُوبِ) مِنْ تَعَلُّقِ الْمُتَعَلِّقِ بِكَسْرِ اللَّامِ بِالْمُتَعَلَّقِ بِفَتْحِهَا وَتِلْكَ الْأَحْكَامُ النِّسَبُ التَّامَّةُ
(His statement: to the actions of the hearts) This is from the attachment of the related (mutaʿalliq, with a kasrah on the lām) to that which is related to (mutaʿallaq, with a fatḥah on it). And those rulings are the complete attributions (al-nisab al-tāmmah).
(قَوْلُهُ وَهِيَ الِاعْتِقَادَاتُ) تَفْسِيرٌ لِأَعْمَالِ الْقُلُوبِ وَقَدْ اُسْتُعْمِلَ اللَّفْظُ فِي حَقِيقَتِهِ وَمَجَازِهِ، وَهُوَ التَّصْدِيقُ عَلَى طَرِيقَةِ مَنْ يُجَوِّزُ ذَلِكَ
(His statement: which are the beliefs) This is an explanation of “actions of the hearts.” The word has been used in both its literal and metaphorical sense, which is affirmation (al-taṣdīq), according to the method of those who permit that.
(قَوْلُهُ الْمُسَمَّاةُ) أَيْ الِاعْتِقَادَاتُ أَيْ مُتَعَلِّقُهَا، وَهِيَ الْأَحْكَامُ بِمَعْنَى النِّسَبِ التَّامَّةِ وَخُلَاصَتُهُ أَنَّ أُصُولَ الدِّينِ النِّسَبُ التَّامَّةُ كَنِسْبَةِ قَوْلِك اللَّهُ قَادِرٌ اللَّهُ مُرِيدٌ اللَّهُ سَمِيعٌ وَغَيْرُ ذَلِكَ وَيَصِحُّ قَوْلُهُ وَهِيَ أَيْ أَحْكَامُ الشَّرِيعَةِ الِاعْتِقَادَاتُ أَيْ الْمُعْتَقَدَاتُ
(His statement: called) i.e., the beliefs, meaning that to which they relate, which are the rulings in the sense of complete attributions. The summary of this is that the Foundations of the Religion are the complete attributions, like the attribution in your statement, “Allah is All-Powerful,” “Allah is All-Willing,” “Allah is All-Hearing,” and so on. And his statement is also correct [if interpreted as]: “which are,” i.e., the rulings of the Sharīʿah, “the beliefs,” i.e., the things believed in (al-muʿtaqadāt).
(قَوْلُهُ أَعْمَالِ الْجَوَارِحِ) مَعْطُوفٌ عَلَى أَعْمَالِ الْقُلُوبِ
(His statement: actions of the limbs) This is conjuncted to “actions of the hearts.”
(قَوْلُهُ الظَّاهِرَةِ) أَيْ الْجَوَارِحِ الْمَوْصُوفَةِ بِكَوْنِهَا ظَاهِرَةً احْتِرَازًا عَنْ الْجَارِحَةِ الْبَاطِنَةِ الَّتِي هِيَ الْقَلْبُ أَوْ صِفَةٌ لِلْأَعْمَالِ أَيْ الْأَعْمَالِ الْمَوْصُوفَةِ بِالظُّهُورِ احْتِرَازًا مِنْ الِاعْتِقَادَاتِ فَإِنَّهَا، وَإِنْ كَانَتْ أَفْعَالًا إلَّا أَنَّهَا لَيْسَتْ ظَاهِرَةً
(His statement: the external) i.e., the limbs described as being external, to preclude the internal limb, which is the heart. Or, it is an adjective for “actions,” i.e., the actions described by externality, to preclude beliefs, for they, even if they are actions, are not external.
(قَوْلُهُ الْمُسَمَّاةُ بِالْفُرُوعِ) صِفَةٌ لِأَعْمَالٍ أَيْ الْمُسَمَّاةِ تِلْكَ الْأَعْمَالُ بِالْفُرُوعِ أَيْ الْمُسَمَّى أَحْكَامُ تِلْكَ الْأَعْمَالِ بِالْفُرُوعِ وَخُلَاصَتُهُ أَنَّ الْفُرُوعَ هِيَ الْأَحْكَامُ، وَهِيَ النِّسَبُ التَّامَّةُ وَهِيَ أَحْكَامُ الْأَعْمَالِ أَيْ أَحْكَامٌ مُتَعَلِّقَةٌ بِالْأَعْمَالِ فَثُبُوتُ الْوُجُوبِ حُكْمٌ مُتَعَلِّقٌ بِالْوُضُوءِ مَثَلًا الَّذِي هُوَ عَمَلٌ مِنْ الْأَعْمَالِ
(His statement: called the Branches) An adjective for “actions,” i.e., those actions are called the Branches. Or, the rulings of those actions are called the Branches. The summary is that the Branches are the rulings, and they are the complete attributions, and they are the rulings of actions, i.e., rulings related to actions. So, the establishment of obligation (wujūb) is a ruling related to ablution (wuḍūʾ), for example, which is an action from among the actions.