وَيُقَابِلُهَا بِهَذَا الْمَعْنَى النَّجَاسَةُ فَيُقَالُ كَمَا قَالَ ابْنُ عَرَفَةَ أَيْضًا هِيَ صِفَةٌ حُكْمِيَّةٌ تُوجِبُ لِمَوْصُوفِهَا مَنْعَ اسْتِبَاحَةِ الصَّلَاةِ بِهِ أَوْ فِيهِ انْتَهَى وَمَعْنَى قَوْلِهِ حُكْمِيَّةٌ أَنَّهُ يُحْكَمُ بِهَا وَيُقَدَّرُ قِيَامُهَا بِمَحَلِّهَا وَلَيْسَتْ مَعْنًى وُجُودِيًّا قَائِمًا بِمَحَلِّهِ لَا مَعْنَوِيًّا كَالْعِلْمِ لِصَاحِبِهِ وَلَا حِسِّيًّا كَالسَّوَادِ وَالْبَيَاضِ وَقَوْلُهُ بِهِ أَيْ بِمُلَابِسِهِ فَيَشْمَلُ الثَّوْبَ وَالْبَدَنَ وَالْمَاءَ وَكُلَّ مَا يَجُوزُ لِلْمُصَلِّي مُلَابَسَتُهُ فَانْدَفَعَ أَنَّهُ لَا يَتَنَاوَلُ طَهَارَةَ الْمَاءِ الْمُضَافِ وَقَوْلُهُ فِيهِ يُرِيدُ بِهِ الْمَكَانَ وَقَوْلُهُ يُرِيدُ بِهِ الْمُصَلِّيَ، وَهُوَ شَامِلٌ لِطَهَارَةِ الْمُصَلِّي مِنْ الْحَدَثِ وَالْخَبَثِ إلَّا أَنَّ قَوْلَهُ بَعْدُ وَالْأَخِيرَةُ مِنْ حَدَثٍ يَخُصُّهُ بِهِ وَقَوْلُهُ فِي حَدِّ النَّجَاسَةِ تُوجِبُ مَنْعَ الصَّلَاةِ بِهِ أَوْ فِيهِ اقْتَصَرَ عَلَى هَذَيْنِ الْأَمْرَيْنِ وَهُمَا الْمُعَبَّرُ عَنْهُمَا بِقَوْلِهِ فِي حَدِّ الطَّهَارَةِ فَالْأُولَيَانِ مِنْ خَبَثٍ وَلَمْ يَقُلْ أَوَّلُهُ كَمَا فِي حَدِّ الطَّهَارَةِ لِأَنَّهُ لَا يُقَالُ شَرْعًا لِلْحَدَثِ نَجَاسَةٌ وَلَا لِلْمُحْدِثِ نَجَسٌ وَالضَّمِيرُ فِي بِهِ وَفِيهِ وَلَهُ عَائِدٌ عَلَى الْمَوْصُوفِ مِنْ قَوْلِهِ تُوجِبُ لِمَوْصُوفِهَا وَمَعْنَى
And impurity (najāsah) is its opposite in this sense. So it is said, as Ibn ‘Arafah also said: It is a legal attribute that necessitates for that which it describes the prevention of the permissibility of prayer with it or in it. End quote. And the meaning of his statement “legal” is that it is ruled by and its existence is presumed in its locus, and it is not an existent quality subsisting in its locus, neither conceptual like knowledge for its possessor, nor sensory like blackness and whiteness. And his statement “with it” (bihi) means with what is in contact with him, so it includes the garment, the body, the water, and everything the praying person is permitted to be in contact with. Thus, [the objection] that it does not include the purity of mixed water is repelled. And his statement “in it” (fīhi), he means the place by it. And his statement, he means the praying person by it, and it is inclusive of the purity of the praying person from ritual impurity (ḥadath) and filth (khabath), except that his statement later, “and the last is from ritual impurity,” specifies it to that. And his statement in the definition of impurity, “necessitates the prevention of prayer with it or in it,” he limited it to these two matters, which are what is expressed by his statement in the definition of purity, “so the first two are from filth.” And he did not say “for him” as in the definition of purity, because it is not said in the Sharīʿah that ritual impurity (ḥadath) is impurity (najāsah), nor that the one in a state of ritual impurity (muḥdith) is impure (najis). And the pronoun in “with it” (bihi), “in it” (fīhi), and “for him” (lahu) refers back to the “described” from his statement “necessitates for that which it describes.” And the meaning…
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[حاشية العدوي]
(قَوْلُهُ وَيُقَابِلُهَا بِهَذَا الْمَعْنَى) أَيْ، وَأَمَّا لَا بِهَذَا الْمَعْنَى فَلَا يُقَابِلُهَا النَّجَاسَةُ بِأَنْ أُرِيدَ مِنْ الطَّهَارَةِ رَفْعُ الْحَدَثِ وَإِزَالَةُ النَّجَاسَةِ كَمَا فِي قَوْلِهِمْ الطَّهَارَةُ وَاجِبَةٌ وَاسْتَظْهَرَ الْحَطَّابُ أَنَّهُ حَقِيقَةٌ فِي الْمَعْنَيَيْنِ فَالْأَحْسَنُ التَّعَرُّضُ لِبَيَانِ كُلٍّ مِنْهُمَا، فَإِنْ اقْتَصَرَ عَلَى أَحَدِهِمَا فَالِاقْتِصَارُ عَلَى الْمَعْنَى الثَّانِي أَوْلَى؛ لِأَنَّهُ الْوَاجِبُ عَلَى الْمُكَلَّفِ وَاَللَّهُ أَعْلَمُ.
His statement (And its opposite in this sense): Meaning, but as for not in this sense, then impurity is not its opposite, such as if what is meant by purity is the removal of ritual impurity and the removal of filth, as in their statement “Purity is obligatory.” And al-Ḥaṭṭāb considered it probable that it is a literal term for both meanings, so it is better to address the explanation of each of them. If one confines it to one of them, then confining it to the second meaning is more appropriate, because it is what is obligatory upon the legally responsible person, and Allah knows best.
(قَوْلُهُ تُوجِبُ لِمَوْصُوفِهَا مَنْعَ اسْتِبَاحَةِ الصَّلَاةِ إلَخْ) أَوْرَدَ عَلَى تَعْرِيفِ النَّجَاسَةِ أَنَّهُ غَيْرُ مَانِعٍ لِشُمُولِهِ الثَّوْبَ الْمَغْصُوبَ وَالدَّارَ الْمَغْصُوبَةَ؛ لِأَنَّهُ يَصْدُقُ عَلَى كُلٍّ أَنَّ بِهِ صِفَةً حُكْمِيَّةً تَمْنَعُ الصَّلَاةَ بِهِ أَوْ فِيهِ وَأُجِيبُ بِأَنَّهُ أَثَرُ الْغَصْبِ الَّذِي هُوَ مَانِعٌ مِنْ إبَاحَةِ الصَّلَاةِ بِالشَّيْءِ الْمَغْصُوبِ أَوْ فِيهِ وَهُوَ تَعَلُّقُ حَقِّ الْمَالِكِ بِهِ لَا يُسَمَّى صِفَةً فِي اصْطِلَاحِ الْفُقَهَاءِ
His statement (necessitates for that which it describes the prevention of the permissibility of prayer, etc.): An objection was raised against the definition of impurity that it is not exclusive, because it includes a usurped garment and a usurped house; because it is true for each that it has a legal attribute that prevents prayer with it or in it. And it was answered that the effect of usurpation, which is an impediment to the permissibility of prayer with the usurped thing or in it—and that is the attachment of the owner’s right to it—is not called an “attribute” (ṣifah) in the terminology of the jurists.
(قَوْلُهُ وَمَعْنَى قَوْلِهِ حُكْمِيَّةٌ إلَخْ) أَيْ فَقَوْلُهُ صِفَةٌ كَالنَّجَسِ يَتَنَاوَلُ جَمِيعَ الصِّفَاتِ
His statement (And the meaning of his statement ’legal’, etc.): Meaning, so his statement ‘attribute’ like ’the impure’ encompasses all attributes.
(قَوْلُهُ وَيُقَدَّرُ قِيَامُهَا) عَطْفُ تَفْسِيرٍ أَيْ فَهِيَ أَمْرٌ اعْتِبَارِيٌّ أُورِدَ عَلَى ذَلِكَ أَنَّ الْأُمُورَ الِاعْتِبَارِيَّةَ لَا تَكُونُ صِفَةً وَالْجَوَابُ بِأَنَّهُ اصْطِلَاحٌ شَرْعِيٌّ وَبِهِ يُجَابُ عَنْ جَعْلِهَا عِلَّةً مَعَ أَنَّهَا عَدَمِيَّةٌ وَالْعِلَّةُ وُجُودِيَّةٌ عَلَى أَنَّ الْعَدَمَ الْمُقَيَّدَ يَجُوزُ أَنْ يَكُونَ عِلَّةً وَالْخِلَافُ فِي تَعْلِيلِ الْوُجُودِ بِالْعَدَمِ فِي الْعِلَّةِ الْمُسْتَنْبَطَةِ أَمَّا الْمَنْصُوصَةُ فَجَائِزٌ بِاتِّفَاقٍ كَالْعَدَمِيَّيْنِ
His statement (and its existence is presumed): This is an explicative conjunction, meaning it is a conceptual matter. An objection was raised to this that conceptual matters cannot be attributes. The answer is that it is a Shar’ī terminology. And with this, the objection to making it a legal cause (ʿillah) is answered, despite it being non-existent while a legal cause must be existent. However, a qualified non-existence is permitted to be a legal cause, and the disagreement regarding justifying existence with non-existence is in the case of an inferred legal cause. As for a textually-stipulated one, it is permissible by consensus, like two non-existences.
(قَوْلُهُ وَلَيْسَتْ مَعْنًى وُجُودِيًّا) أَيْ لَيْسَتْ صِفَةً وُجُودِيَّةً يُمْكِنُ رُؤْيَتُهَا
His statement (and it is not an existent quality): Meaning, it is not an existent attribute that can be seen.
(قَوْلُهُ لَا مَعْنَوِيًّا) أَرَادَ بِهِ الْأَمْرَ الْوُجُودِيَّ الَّذِي يُمْكِنُ رُؤْيَتُهُ لَكِنْ لَمْ تَجْرِ الْعَادَةُ بِالرُّؤْيَةِ كَالْعِلْمِ وَالْقُدْرَةِ وَالْكَلَامِ
His statement (neither conceptual): He meant by it the existent matter that could be seen, but which is not customarily seen, like knowledge, power, and speech.
(قَوْلُهُ وَلَا حِسِّيًّا) أَيْ كَالْبَيَاضِ وَالسَّوَادِ مِمَّا يُرَى بِحَاسَّةِ الْبَصَرِ وَاللَّامُ فِي قَوْلِهِ لِمَوْصُوفِهَا لِشِبْهِ الْمِلْكِ وَالِاسْتِحْقَاقِ لَا لِلتَّعْلِيلِ؛ لِأَنَّهُ يَقْتَضِي أَنَّ الْمَعْنَى أَنَّ إيجَابَ اسْتِبَاحَةٍ لِأَجْلِ الْمَوْصُوفِ لَا لِلْمَوْصُوفِ وَالْمَعْنَى عَلَى جَعْلِهَا لِشِبْهِ الْمِلْكِ وَالِاسْتِحْقَاقِ ظَاهِرٌ أَيْ أَنَّ الْمَوْصُوفَ صَارَ كَالْمَالِكِ لِإِبَاحَةِ الصَّلَاةِ أَوْ مُسْتَحِقًّا لَهَا ثُمَّ هَذَا ظَاهِرٌ إنْ جَعَلَ قَوْلَهُ لِمَوْصُوفِهَا مُتَعَلِّقًا بِمَا بَعْدَهُ مِنْ قَوْلِهِ جَوَازَ اسْتِبَاحَتِهِ إلَخْ، وَأَمَّا عَلَى جَعْلِهَا مُتَعَلِّقَةً بِ تُوجِبُ فَهِيَ لِلتَّعْدِيَةِ.
His statement (nor sensory): Meaning, like whiteness and blackness, from that which is seen by the sense of sight. And the lām in his statement “for that which it describes” (li-mawṣūfihā) indicates quasi-ownership and entitlement, not causality, because that would imply that the meaning is that the necessitation of permissibility is for the sake of the described, not for the described itself. And the meaning, when making it for quasi-ownership and entitlement, is clear, i.e., that the described has become like the owner of the permissibility of prayer or entitled to it. Then, this is apparent if one makes his statement “for that which it describes” relate to what comes after it, from his statement “the permissibility of its allowance, etc.” But if it is made to relate to “necessitates” (tūjibu), then it is for transitivity.
(فَإِنْ قُلْت) يَرِدُ عَلَى هَذَا طَهَارَةُ الْمَيِّتِ فَإِنَّهَا أَوْجَبَتْ اسْتِبَاحَةَ الصَّلَاةِ عَلَيْهِ وَلَمْ تُوجِبْ اسْتِبَاحَةَ الصَّلَاةِ لَهُ وَلَا بِهِ وَلَا فِيهِ فَكَانَ عَلَيْهِ أَنْ يَزِيدَ أَوْ عَلَيْهِ لِيَدْخُلَ ذَلِكَ وَيَجْرِيَ نَحْوُهُ فِي طَهَارَةِ الذِّمِّيَّةِ لِزَوْجِهَا الْمُسْلِمِ أَيْ لِوَطْئِهَا فَكَانَ عَلَيْهِ أَنْ يَزِيدَ أَوْ لِلتَّمَتُّعِ بِهِ أَيْضًا وَبَعْدَ ذَلِكَ لَا يَشْمَلُ الْوُضُوءَ لِلسَّلَاطِينِ وَالْوُضُوءَ لِلتِّلَاوَةِ أَيْضًا وَالْجَوَابُ أَنَّ الْمُرَادَ تُوجِبُ لَهُ الْجَوَازَ بِشَرْطِ تَوَفُّرِ الشُّرُوطِ وَانْتِفَاءِ الْمَوَانِعِ؛ وَلِذَا لَوْ وُجِدَتْ الطَّهَارَةُ الْكُبْرَى وَحَصَلَ مَانِعُ الصُّغْرَى فَلَا يُقَالُ أَنَّ الْكُبْرَى لَيْسَتْ طَهَارَةً لِعَدَمِ إيجَابِهَا الْإِبَاحَةَ الْمَذْكُورَةَ بَلْ طَهَارَةٌ وَعَدَمُ إيجَابِهَا الْمَانِعَ لَا يُخْرِجُهَا عَنْ كَوْنِهَا طَهَارَةً فَطُهْرُ الذِّمِّيَّةِ وَمَا مَعَهَا طَهَارَةٌ لَوْلَا الْمَانِعَ وَالْمَانِعُ هُوَ الْمَوْتُ وَالْكُفْرُ، وَأَمَّا الْوُضُوءُ لِلدُّخُولِ عَلَى السَّلَاطِينِ وَنَحْوِهِ فَلَيْسَ بِطَهَارَةٍ شَرْعِيَّةٍ وَالتَّعْرِيفُ لَهَا وَفِيهِ شَيْءٌ لِظَاهِرِ إطْلَاقِهِمْ عَلَيْهِ أَنَّهُ طَهَارَةٌ وَشَرْعًا، وَأَمَّا الْأَوْضِيَةُ الْمُسْتَحَبَّةُ وَالِاغْتِسَالَاتُ الْمَسْنُونَةُ وَالْمُسْتَحَبَّةُ الَّتِي يُصَلَّى بِهَا فَإِنَّهَا تُوجِبُ جَوَازَ الِاسْتِبَاحَةِ لَوْلَا وُجُودُ مِثْلِهَا إذْ الْمِثْلَانِ لَا يَجْتَمِعَانِ وَلَا يَرِدُ عَلَى الرَّسْمِ أَنَّهُ صَادِقٌ عَلَى الْقِرَاءَةِ وَسَتْرِ الْعَوْرَةِ وَإِحْرَامِ الصَّلَاةِ فَإِنَّهَا صِفَاتٌ تُوجِبُ لِمَوْصُوفِهَا مَا ذُكِرَ وَلَيْسَ شَيْءٌ مِنْهَا طَهَارَةً؛ لِأَنَّهُ أُجِيبَ بِأَنَّ هَذِهِ أَفْعَالٌ لَا صِفَاتٌ فَلَا يَصْدُقُ عَلَيْهَا مَبْدَأُ الرَّسْمِ أَوْ يُقَالُ أَنَّ الصَّلَاةَ بِدُونِ الْأَوْضِيَةِ الْمُسْتَحَبَّةِ وَالِاغْتِسَالَاتِ الْمُسْتَحَبَّةِ أَوْ الْمَسْنُونَةِ مَكْرُوهَةٌ أَوْ خِلَافُ الْأَوْلَى فَلَا تَكُونُ مُبَاحَةً وَبِهَا تَصِيرُ مُبَاحَةً فَصَدَقَ التَّعْرِيفُ عَلَيْهَا.
(If you were to say): An objection to this is the purity of the deceased, for it necessitates the permissibility of prayer over him, but does not necessitate the permissibility of prayer for him, nor with him, nor in him. So he should have added “or over him” to include that. And something similar applies to the purity of a dhimmi woman for her Muslim husband, i.e., for intercourse with her, so he should have added “or for enjoyment with him” as well. And after that, it does not include ablution for [meeting] sultans and ablution for recitation either. And the answer is that what is meant is that it necessitates permissibility for him on the condition that the conditions are met and the impediments are absent. For this reason, if major purity exists but an impediment for minor purity occurs, it is not said that the major purity is not purity due to its not necessitating the aforementioned permissibility. Rather, it is purity, and its not necessitating [permissibility] due to the impediment does not remove it from being purity. So the purity of the dhimmi woman and what is with it is purity were it not for the impediment, and the impediment is death and disbelief. As for ablution for entering upon sultans and the like, it is not a Shar’ī purity, and the definition is for that [Shar’ī purity]. And there is an issue with this, because of the apparentness of their applying the term ‘purity’ and ‘Shar’ī’ to it. As for the recommended ablutions and the sunnah and recommended ritual baths with which one prays, they do necessitate the permissibility of allowance were it not for the existence of its like, since two likes do not coexist. And it is not an objection to the description that it is true of recitation, covering the ‘awrah, and the iḥrām of prayer, for these are attributes that necessitate for that which they describe what was mentioned, yet none of them is purity; because it has been answered that these are actions, not attributes, so the beginning of the description is not true of them. Or it is said that prayer without the recommended ablutions and the recommended or sunnah ritual baths is disliked (makrūh) or contrary to what is better (khilāf al-awlā), so it is not [fully] permissible, and with them it becomes permissible, so the definition is true of them.
(قَوْلُهُ بِهِ أَيْ بِمُلَابِسِهِ) كَذَا فِي نُسْخَتِهِ وَالْمُنَاسِبُ بِمُلَابَسَتِهِ كَمَا هُوَ مَوْجُودٌ فِي الشُّرَّاحِ
His statement (‘with it’ (bihi), i.e., with what is in contact with him (bi-mulābisihi)): Thus it is in his copy, but the more appropriate wording is ‘with his contact with it’ (bi-mulābasatihi), as is found in the commentators.
(قَوْلُهُ وَالْبَدَنَ) أَيْ بَدَنَ الْمُصَلِّي
His statement (and the body): Meaning, the body of the praying person.
(قَوْلُهُ وَالْمَاءَ) الَّذِي يَحْمِلُهُ الْمُصَلِّي لِقَوْلِهِ وَكُلُّ مَا يَجُوزُ لِلْمُصَلِّي مُلَابَسَتُهُ
His statement (and the water): That which the praying person carries, due to his statement ‘and everything the praying person is permitted to be in contact with’.
(قَوْلُهُ أَنَّهُ لَا يَتَنَاوَلُ طَهَارَةَ الْمَاءِ الْمُضَافِ) الْأَحْسَنُ أَنْ يَقُولَ فَانْدَفَعَ الْبَحْثُ بِأَنَّهُ لَا يَشْمَلُ طَهَارَةَ الْجَسَدِ مِنْ الْخَبَثِ وَغَيْرِ ذَلِكَ مِنْ كُلِّ مُلَابِسٍ لِلْمُصَلِّي وَقَوْلُهُ الْمَاءُ الْمُضَافُ لَا خُصُوصِيَّةً لِلْمَاءِ وَلَا قَيْدَ كَوْنِهِ مُضَافًا؛ لِأَنَّ الْبَحْثَ وَارِدٌ بِكُلِّ مَا يَحْمِلُهُ الْمُصَلِّي كَانَ مَاءً أَوْ غَيْرَهُ كَانَ الْمَاءُ مُضَافًا أَمْ لَا وَيُرَادُ بِقَوْلِهِ بِمُلَابَسَتِهِ أَيْ مَعَ الِاتِّصَالِ بِهِ فَلَا يَرِدُ أَنَّهُ يَسْتَغْنِي عَنْ فِيهِ بِتَقْدِيرِ مُلَابِسِهِ
His statement (that it does not include the purity of mixed water): It would be better to say: ‘Thus the argument is repelled that it does not include the purity of the body from filth and other such things from all that is in contact with the praying person.’ And his statement ‘mixed water’—there is no specificity to water, nor a restriction of it being mixed, because the argument applies to everything the praying person carries, whether it is water or something else, and whether the water is mixed or not. And what is meant by his statement ‘with his contact with it’ is with connection to it, so the objection that one can dispense with ‘in it’ (fīhi) by positing ‘what is in contact with him’ does not apply.
(قَوْلُهُ: وَهُوَ شَامِلٌ إلَخْ) حَاصِلُهُ أَنَّ الْمُصَلِّيَ يُقَالُ لَهُ مُتَطَهِّرٌ بِالنِّسْبَةِ لِطَهَارَتِهِ مِنْ الْحَدَثِ بِالْوُضُوءِ وَمُتَطَهِّرٌ بِالنِّسْبَةِ لِطَهَارَةِ بَدَنِهِ مِنْ الْخَبَثِ لَكِنْ قَوْلُ ابْنِ عَرَفَةَ وَالْأَخِيرَةُ مِنْ حَدَثٍ تَقْصُرُ الْمُصَلِّيَ عَلَى الْمُصَلِّي عَلَى الْحَدَثِ فَلَا يُقَالُ لَهُ مُتَطَهِّرٌ بِاعْتِبَارِ طَهَارَةِ الْخَبَثِ وَإِنَّمَا يُقَالُ لَهُ مُتَطَهِّرٌ بِاعْتِبَارِ الْحَدَثِ
His statement (And it is inclusive, etc.): The summary of it is that the praying person is called ‘purified’ (mutaṭahhir) in relation to his purity from ritual impurity (ḥadath) through ablution, and ‘purified’ in relation to the purity of his body from filth (khabath), but the statement of Ibn ‘Arafah, ‘and the last is from ritual impurity,’ restricts [the term for] the praying person to the praying person [purified] from ritual impurity. So he is not called ‘purified’ by virtue of purity from filth; rather, he is only called ‘purified’ by virtue of [purity from] ritual impurity.
(وَأَقُولُ) بِحَمْدِ اللَّهِ إيرَادُهُمْ الْبَدَنَ وَجَوَابَهُ بِأَنَّهُ دَاخِلٌ فِي قَوْلِهِ بِهِ دَلِيلٌ عَلَى أَنَّ الْمُرَادَ بِالشَّخْصِ الرُّوحُ فَقَطْ فَلَا يُقَالُ حِينَئِذٍ أَنَّ قَوْلَهُ لَهُ شَامِلٌ لِطَهَارَةِ الْمُصَلِّي مِنْ الْحَدَثِ وَالْخَبَثِ
(And I say), with praise to Allah, their inclusion of the body and their answer that it is included in his statement ‘with it’ is evidence that what is meant by ’the person’ is the soul only. So it is not said then that his statement ‘for him’ is inclusive of the purity of the praying person from ritual impurity and filth.
(قَوْلُهُ وَلَا لِلْمُحْدِثِ نَجَسٌ) نَقُولُ مُسَلَّمٌ أَنَّهُ لَا يُقَالُ لَهُ نَجَسٌ بِاعْتِبَارِ الْحَدَثِ لَكِنْ يُقَالُ لَهُ نَجَسٌ بِاعْتِبَارِ قِيَامِ النَّجَاسَةِ بِبَدَنِهِ أَيْ مُتَنَجِّسٌ.
His statement (nor for the one in a state of ritual impurity ‘impure’ (najis)): We say: it is conceded that he is not called ‘impure’ (najis) by virtue of ritual impurity (ḥadath), but he is called ‘impure’ (najis) by virtue of the presence of impurity on his body, meaning ‘rendered impure’ (mutanajjis).
(قَوْلُهُ وَالضَّمِيرُ إلَخْ) حَاصِلُهُ أَنَّ طَهَارَةَ الْحَدَثِ وَالْخَبَثِ اشْتَرَكَا فِي أَنَّ كُلًّا يُوجِبُ لِمَوْصُوفِهِ اسْتِبَاحَةَ الصَّلَاةِ
His statement (And the pronoun, etc.): The summary of it is that purity from ritual impurity and purity from filth share in that each necessitates for that which it describes the permissibility of prayer.