تُوجِبُ تُصَحِّحُ وَمَعْنَى جَوَازِ اسْتِبَاحَةِ الصَّلَاةِ أَيْ تُصَحِّحُ لِمَوْصُوفِهَا جَوَازَ طَلَبِ إبَاحَةِ الصَّلَاةِ وَمَعْنَاهُ أَنَّ طَلَبَ إبَاحَةِ الصَّلَاةِ شَرْعًا مَعَ الْمَانِعِ كَانَ مَمْنُوعًا فَإِنَّ الْمُكَلَّفَ لَا يَجُوزُ لَهُ شَرْعًا طَلَبُ إبَاحَةِ الصَّلَاةِ مِنْ غَيْرِ مِفْتَاحِهَا، وَهُوَ الطَّهَارَةُ؛ لِأَنَّ مَنْ لَيْسَ مَعَهُ مِفْتَاحٌ لَا يَجُوزُ لَهُ أَنْ يَتَسَوَّرَ عَلَى طَلَبِ إبَاحَةِ الدُّخُولِ فَإِذَا وَجَدَ مِفْتَاحَهَا ثَبَتَ جَوَازُ طَلَبِ إبَاحَةِ الدُّخُولِ فَلَيْسَ فِي قَوْلِهِ جَوَازُ إضَافَةِ الشَّيْءِ إلَى نَفْسِهِ كَمَا قِيلَ.
It necessitates means it makes valid. And the meaning of “permissibility of seeking the permissibility of prayer” is that it makes valid for that which is described by it the permissibility of seeking the permissibility of prayer. Its meaning is that seeking the permissibility of prayer according to the Shari’ah, while an impediment exists, was forbidden. For the legally responsible person is not permitted by the Shari’ah to seek the permissibility of prayer without its key, which is purity (ṭahārah); because one who does not have a key is not permitted to presume to seek the permissibility of entry. So when he finds its key, the permissibility of seeking the permissibility of entry is established. Therefore, his statement does not contain the attribution of a thing to itself, as has been claimed.
(ص) يُرْفَعُ الْحَدَثُ وَحُكْمُ الْخَبَثِ بِالْمُطْلَقِ (ش) يَعْنِي أَنَّ الْحَدَثَ، وَهُوَ الْمَنْعُ الْمُتَرَتِّبُ عَلَى أَعْضَاءِ الْوُضُوءِ أَوْ الْغُسْلِ لَا يَرْفَعُهُ إلَّا الْمَاءُ الْمُطْلَقُ وَكَذَلِكَ حُكْمُ الْخَبَثِ، وَهُوَ الْبَاقِي بَعْدَ زَوَالِ الْعَيْنِ لَا يُزَالُ إلَّا بِالْمُطْلَقِ، وَأَمَّا عَيْنُ النَّجَاسَةِ فَتُزَالُ بِكُلِّ قِلَاعٍ وَالْحَدَثُ بِفَتْحَتَيْنِ لُغَةً وُجُودُ الشَّيْءِ بَعْدَ أَنْ لَمْ يَكُنْ وَشَرْعًا يُطْلَقُ عَلَى الْخَارِجِ الْمُعْتَادِ وَعَلَى الْخُرُوجِ كَمَا فِي قَوْلِهِمْ آدَابُ الْحَدَثِ وَعَلَى الْوَصْفِ الْحُكْمِيِّ الْمُقَدَّرِ قِيَامُهُ بِالْأَعْضَاءِ قِيَامَ الْأَوْصَافِ الْحِسِّيَّةِ كَمَا فِي قَوْلِهِمْ يَمْنَعُ الْحَدَثَ كَذَا وَعَلَى الْمَنْعِ الْمُتَرَتِّبِ عَلَى الثَّلَاثَةِ كَمَا فِي قَوْلِهِمْ هُنَا يُرْفَعُ الْحَدَثُ وَيَصِحُّ هُنَا إرَادَةُ الْمَعْنَى الثَّالِثِ الَّذِي هُوَ الْوَصْفُ؛ لِأَنَّهُمَا مُتَلَازِمَانِ فَإِذَا ارْتَفَعَ أَحَدُهُمَا ارْتَفَعَ الْآخَرُ وَلَا يَصِحُّ إرَادَةُ الْمَعْنَيَيْنِ
(Text) Ritual impurity (al-ḥadath) and the ruling of filth (ḥukm al-khabath) are lifted by absolute [water]. (Commentary) Meaning that ḥadath, which is the impediment consequent upon the limbs of ablution (wuḍūʾ) or the major ablution (ghusl), is lifted only by absolute water. Likewise, the ruling of filth, which is what remains after the removal of the substance, is only removed by absolute [water]. As for the substance of the impurity itself, it is removed by any remover. And al-ḥadath (with two fatḥas), linguistically, is the existence of a thing after it was not. And in the Shari’ah, it is applied to the customary emission, and to the act of exiting, as in their statement “etiquettes of ḥadath (relieving oneself),” and to the legal attribute which is presumed to subsist in the limbs like sensory attributes subsist, as in their statement “ḥadath prevents such-and-such,” and to the impediment that is consequent upon the three [previous meanings], as in their statement here “ḥadath is lifted.” It is correct here to intend the third meaning, which is the attribute, because the two [the attribute and the impediment] are concomitant; so if one is lifted, the other is lifted. And it is not correct to intend both meanings.
ــ
[حاشية العدوي]
فَفِي الْخَبَثِ تُوجِبُ اسْتِبَاحَةَ الصَّلَاةِ لِمَوْصُوفِهَا أَوْ فِي مَوْصُوفِهَا وَفِي الْحَدَثِ تُوجِبُ الِاسْتِبَاحَةَ لِمَوْصُوفِهَا فَضَمِيرُ بِهِ وَفِيهِ وَلَهُ كُلٌّ يَعُودُ عَلَى الْمَوْصُوفِ وَلَمَّا أَبْهَمَ طَهَارَةَ الْحَدَثِ وَالْخَبَثِ بَيَّنَ ذَلِكَ فَقَالَ وَالْأُولَيَانِ مِنْ خَبَثٍ وَالْأَخِيرَةُ مِنْ حَدَثٍ
[Commentary by al-ʿAdawī]
So in the case of filth (khabath), it necessitates seeking the permissibility of prayer for that which is described by it or in that which is described by it. And in the case of ritual impurity (ḥadath), it necessitates seeking the permissibility for that which is described by it. So the pronouns in bihi, fīhi, and lahu all refer back to al-mawṣūf (that which is described). And when he left the purity from ḥadath and khabath ambiguous, he clarified that by saying: “And the first two are from khabath, and the last is from ḥadath.”
(قَوْلُهُ تُصَحِّحُ) أَيْ تُسَبِّبُ لِمَوْصُوفِهَا الْجَوَازَ وَالْمُرَادُ أَنَّهَا سَبَبٌ فِي جَوَازِ الصَّلَاةِ، وَإِنْ شِئْت قُلْت فِي إبَاحَةِ الصَّلَاةِ، وَلَيْسَ الْمُرَادُ بِالْإِيجَابِ حَقِيقَتَهُ؛ لِأَنَّهُ خِلَافُ مَذْهَبِ أَهْلِ السُّنَّةِ (فَإِنْ قُلْت) هَذَا يُخَالِفُ مَا تَقَرَّرَ مِنْ أَنَّهَا شَرْطٌ نَقُولُ لَا مُخَالَفَةَ؛ لِأَنَّهَا سَبَبٌ فِي إبَاحَةِ الصَّلَاةِ وَشَرْطٌ فِي صِحَّتِهَا ثُمَّ إنَّ كَلَامَهُ قَاصِرٌ؛ لِأَنَّهَا كَمَا تُسَبِّبُ جَوَازَ الصَّلَاةِ تُسَبِّبُ جَوَازَ غَيْرِهَا مِنْ طَوَافٍ وَمَسِّ مُصْحَفٍ وَغَيْرِ ذَلِكَ مِمَّا هُوَ مَعْلُومٌ (وَأُجِيبُ) بِأَنَّهُ يَلْزَمُ مِنْ جَوَازِ الصَّلَاةِ جَوَازُ غَيْرِهَا إلَّا أَنَّهُ يُرَادُ أَنَّهُ لَا يَكْتَفِي بِدَلَالَةِ الِالْتِزَامِ فِي التَّعْرِيفِ فَتَدَبَّرْ، ثُمَّ لَا يَخْفَى أَنَّ الِاحْتِمَالَاتِ أَرْبَعَةٌ؛ لِأَنَّهُ إمَّا أَنْ يُسْقِطَ جَوَازَ وَاسْتِبَاحَةَ أَوْ يَذْكُرَ الْأَوَّلَ دُونَ الثَّانِي أَوْ بِالْعَكْسِ أَوْ يَذْكُرَهُمَا مَعًا أَمَّا عَدَمُ ذِكْرِهِمَا مَعًا بِأَنْ يَقُولَ تُوجِبُ لِمَوْصُوفِهَا الصَّلَاةَ فَلَا يَصِحُّ سَوَاءٌ أُرِيدَ مِنْ الْإِيجَابِ حَقِيقَتُهُ أَوْ التَّسَبُّبُ فَتَعَيَّنَ تَقْدِيرُ شَيْءٍ، ثُمَّ إنَّ ابْنَ عَرَفَةَ ذَكَرَ الْأَمْرَيْنِ اسْتِبَاحَةَ وَجَوَازَ فَاعْتُرِضَ بِأَنَّ فِيهِ إضَافَةَ الشَّيْءِ إلَى نَفْسِهِ فَأَجَابَ الشَّارِحُ بِأَنَّ ذَلِكَ مَدْفُوعٌ بِجَعْلِ السِّينِ وَالتَّاءِ لِلطَّلَبِ (أَقُولُ) بِحَمْدِ اللَّهِ اعْلَمْ أَوَّلًا أَنَّ إضَافَةَ الشَّيْءِ إلَى نَفْسِهِ جَائِزَةٌ عِنْدَ الْكُوفِيِّينَ، وَهُوَ الْمُعْتَمَدُ فَلَا مَانِعَ مِنْ ذَلِكَ.
(His statement: tuṣaḥḥiḥu [it makes valid]) i.e., it causes permissibility for that which is described by it. The meaning is that it is a cause for the permissibility of prayer, or if you wish, you could say for the allowance of prayer. And what is not meant by “necessitating” (al-ījāb) is its literal meaning, because that is contrary to the school of Ahl al-Sunnah. (If you say:) This contradicts what has been established, that it is a condition (sharṭ). (We say:) There is no contradiction, because it is a cause (sabab) for the permissibility of prayer and a condition for its validity. Furthermore, his statement is deficient, because just as it causes the permissibility of prayer, it causes the permissibility of other things, like circumambulation (ṭawāf), touching a copy of the Qur’an (muṣḥaf), and other such things that are known. (And it was answered) that the permissibility of other things is entailed by the permissibility of prayer, except that what is meant is that one does not suffice with implicative indication in a definition, so reflect. Then, it is not hidden that the possibilities are four: for he either omits “permissibility” (jawāz) and “seeking permissibility” (istibāḥah), or mentions the first without the second, or the reverse, or mentions them both together. As for not mentioning them both, by saying “it necessitates prayer for that which is described by it,” this is not correct, whether the literal meaning of “necessitating” is intended or “causing.” So something must be supplied. Then, Ibn ʿArafah mentioned both matters, “seeking permissibility” and “permissibility,” and it was objected that this contains the attribution of a thing to itself. The commentator answered that this is rebutted by making the sīn and tāʾ [in istibāḥah] for seeking. (I say,) with praise to Allah, know firstly that the attribution of a thing to itself is permissible according to the Kufans, and this is the relied-upon position, so there is no impediment to that.
وَثَانِيًا إنَّ جَعْلَهَا لِلطَّلَبِ غَيْرُ ظَاهِرٍ؛ لِأَنَّهُ يُفِيدُ أَنَّ كُلَّ مَوْصُوفٍ بِهَا كَانَ ثَوْبًا أَوْ مَكَانًا أَوْ شَخْصًا يَطْلُبُ مِنْ اللَّهِ إبَاحَةَ ذَلِكَ وَهَذَا غَيْرُ وَاقِعٍ فَالْأَحْسَنُ أَنْ تَجْعَلَ السِّينَ وَالتَّاءَ زَائِدَتَيْنِ وَالْإِضَافَةُ صَحِيحَةٌ عَلَى مَذْهَبِ الْكُوفِيِّينَ نَعَمْ لَوْ حَذَفَ ابْنُ عَرَفَةَ أَحَدَ اللَّفْظَيْنِ وَاكْتَفَى بِوَاحِدٍ لَكَانَ أَخْصَرَ، وَإِنْ أَرَدْت تَمَامَ الْكَلَامِ فِي ذَلِكَ الْمَقَامِ فَرَاجِعْ عج وَلَكِنْ فِيمَا ذَكَرْنَا كِفَايَةٌ لِلْقَاصِرِينَ
And secondly, making it [the sīn and tāʾ] for seeking is not apparent, because it would imply that everything described by it—be it a garment, a place, or a person—seeks from Allah the permissibility of that, and this is not what happens. So it is better to make the sīn and tāʾ superfluous, and the attribution is correct according to the school of the Kufans. Yes, if Ibn ʿArafah had deleted one of the two words and sufficed with one, it would have been more concise. And if you want the complete discussion on that topic, then refer to ‘Aj [al-Ujhūrī], but in what we have mentioned is a sufficiency for the beginners.
(قَوْلُهُ فَإِنَّ الْمُكَلَّفَ إلَخْ) أَيْ مَثَلًا لِمَا أَنَّ الْمَوْصُوفَ أَعَمُّ مِنْ الْمُكَلَّفِ وَفِيهِ مَا تَقَدَّمَ
(His statement: for the legally responsible person, etc.) i.e., as an example, since “that which is described” is more general than “the legally responsible person,” and in it is what was mentioned previously.
(قَوْلُهُ أَنْ يَتَسَوَّرَ) أَيْ يُقَدِّمَ
(His statement: an yatasawwara [to presume]) i.e., to proceed.
(قَوْلُهُ الْمَنْعُ) أَيْ تَحْرِيمُ قُرْبَانِ الْعِبَادَةِ وَقَوْلُهُ الْمُتَرَتِّبُ أَيْ الْمُتَعَلِّقُ وَلَيْسَ الْمُرَادُ الْقَائِمَ بِالْأَعْضَاءِ؛ لِأَنَّهُ صِفَةُ الْمَوْلَى جَلَّ وَعَزَّ (فَإِنْ قُلْت) إنَّمَا هُوَ مُتَعَلِّقٌ بِالشَّخْصِ لَا بِالْأَعْضَاءِ (قُلْنَا) الْمَعْنَى أَنَّهُ مُتَعَلِّقٌ بِالشَّخْصِ بِاعْتِبَارِ تِلْكَ الْأَعْضَاءِ أَوْ تَجَوُّزٍ فِي ذَلِكَ
(His statement: the impediment) i.e., the prohibition of approaching the act of worship. And his statement al-mutarattib (consequent) means al-mutaʿalliq (related to), and what is not meant is that which subsists in the limbs, because it is an attribute of the Master, Majestic and Exalted. (If you say:) It is only related to the person, not to the limbs. (We say:) The meaning is that it is related to the person with respect to those limbs, or it is a metaphor in that regard.
(قَوْلُهُ لَا يَرْفَعُهُ إلَّا الْمَاءُ الْمُطْلَقُ) أُخِذَ الْحَصْرُ إمَّا مِنْ قَوْلِهِ فِيمَا يَأْتِي لَا بِمُتَغَيِّرٍ لَوْنًا أَوْ طَعْمًا أَوْ رِيحًا أَيْ وَأَوْلَى غَيْرُهُ مِنْ الْمَاءِ الْمُضَافِ وَالْجَمَادِ أَوْ يُقَالُ كَمَا قَالَ الْحَطَّابُ إنَّ تَصْدِيرَ الْبَابِ بِهَذِهِ الْجُمْلَةِ وَسِيَاقَهَا مَسَاقَ الْحَدِّ يُفِيدُ الْحَصْرَ، وَإِنْ لَمْ يَكُنْ فِي الْكَلَامِ أَدَاةُ حَصْرٍ فَكَأَنَّهُ قَالَ إنَّمَا يُرْفَعُ الْحَدَثُ وَحُكْمُ الْخَبَثِ بِالْمَاءِ الْمُطْلَقِ بَلْ وَكُلُّ طَهَارَةٍ شَرْعِيَّةٍ مِنْ غُسْلٍ أَوْ وُضُوءٍ، وَإِنْ لَمْ تَكُنْ وَاجِبَةً فَلَا يَصِحُّ شَيْءٌ مِنْ ذَلِكَ إلَّا بِالْمَاءِ الْمُطْلَقِ أَوْ أَنَّهُ أَخَذَهُ مِنْ مَفْهُومِ الْمُطْلَقِ تَأَمَّلْ
(His statement: Only absolute water lifts it) The sense of exclusion is derived either from his later statement, “not with that which has changed in color, taste, or smell”—meaning, and a fortiori anything else, like mixed water or a solid—or it is said, as al-Ḥaṭṭāb said, that beginning the chapter with this sentence and framing it in the manner of a definition implies exclusion, even if there is no particle of exclusion in the statement. It is as if he said, “Ḥadath and the ruling of khabath are lifted only by absolute water.” Indeed, every legal purification, whether ghusl or wuḍūʾ, even if not obligatory, none of it is valid except with absolute water. Or, he derived it from the implication of “absolute.” Reflect.
(قَوْلُهُ: وَهُوَ الْبَاقِي إلَخْ) ذَلِكَ الْبَاقِي أَمْرٌ اعْتِبَارِيٌّ، وَهُوَ كَوْنُ الشَّيْءِ نَجَسًا فِي الشَّرْعِ لَا تُبَاحُ مُلَابَسَتُهُ فِي الصَّلَاةِ وَالْغِذَاءِ فَلَا يَرْتَفِعُ إلَّا بِالْمَاءِ الْمُطْلَقِ، وَأَمَّا مَوْضِعُ الِاسْتِجْمَارِ وَالسَّيْفُ الصَّقِيلِ وَنَحْوُهُ إذَا مُسِحَ وَالْخُفُّ وَالنَّعْلُ إذَا دُلِّكَا مِنْ أَبْوَالِ الدَّوَابِّ وَأَرْوَاثِهَا فَالْمَحَلُّ مَحْكُومٌ لَهُ بِالنَّجَاسَةِ وَإِنَّمَا عُفِيَ عَنْهُ لِلضَّرُورَةِ وَخُلَاصَتُهُ أَنَّ ذَلِكَ الْحُكْمَ صِفَةٌ اعْتِبَارِيَّةٌ قَائِمَةٌ بِالْمَحَلِّ وَلَيْسَ الْمُرَادُ الْحُكْمَ الشَّرْعِيَّ
(His statement: and it is that which remains, etc.) That which remains is a conceptual matter, which is the state of the thing being impure according to the Shari’ah, such that contact with it is not permitted in prayer or food. So it is not lifted except by absolute water. As for the place of istijmār (cleaning with stones), a polished sword and the like when it is wiped, and the leather sock (khuff) and sandal when they are rubbed from the urine and droppings of riding animals, the locus is ruled as being impure, and it is only pardoned due to necessity. The summary of this is that this “ruling” is a conceptual attribute subsisting in the locus, and what is not meant is the legal ruling (al-ḥukm al-sharʿī).
(قَوْلُهُ بِكُلِّ قِلَاعٍ) أَيْ بِكُلِّ شَيْءٍ يَقْلَعُهَا وَيُزِيلُهَا
(His statement: with any remover) i.e., with anything that eradicates and removes it.
(قَوْلُهُ وُجُودُ الشَّيْءِ) أَيْ وَالْحَادِثُ الْمَوْجُودُ بَعْدَ الْعَدَمِ وَهَلْ الْوُجُودُ وَجْهٌ وَاعْتِبَارٌ أَوْ حَالٌ قَوْلَانِ
(His statement: the existence of the thing) i.e., and the emergent thing which exists after non-existence. And is existence a perspective and a concept, or a state? There are two opinions.
(قَوْلُهُ كَمَا فِي قَوْلِهِمْ آدَابُ الْحَدَثِ بِمَعْنَى الْخُرُوجِ) أَيْ وَالْخَارِجُ مِنْ حَيْثُ الْخُرُوجُ
(His statement: as in their statement “etiquettes of ḥadath” with the meaning of exiting) i.e., the emission from the perspective of its exiting.
(قَوْلُهُ وَعَلَى الْوَصْفِ الْحُكْمِيِّ) أَيْ الَّذِي حَكَمَ بِهِ الشَّرْعُ أَوْ الْمَعْنَى لَا حِسِّيٌّ فَهُوَ اعْتِبَارِيٌّ لَا وُجُودِيٌّ
(His statement: and upon the legal attribute) i.e., that which the Shari’ah has ruled, or the meaning is non-sensory, so it is conceptual, not existential.
(قَوْلُهُ قِيَامَ) أَيْ كَقِيَامِ
(His statement: qiyāma [subsisting]) i.e., ka-qiyāmi (like the subsisting).
(قَوْلُهُ وَعَلَى الْمَنْعِ الْمُتَرَتِّبِ) أَيْ الْمُتَسَبِّبِ أَيْ تَعَلُّقُهُ لِمَا يَأْتِي وَأَنْتَ خَبِيرٌ بِأَنَّ هَذَا الْمَنْعَ فِي الْحَقِيقَةِ إنَّمَا هُوَ مُتَسَبِّبٌ عَنْ الْخُرُوجِ وَأَنَّهُ مُقَارِبٌ لِلْوَصْفِ فِي التَّرَتُّبِ لَا أَنَّ التَّرَتُّبَ سَابِقٌ عَلَيْهِ وَيُجَابُ بِأَنَّهُ سَابِقٌ عَلَيْهِ وَيُجَابُ بِأَنَّهُ سَابِقٌ عَلَيْهِ تَعَقُّلًا
(His statement: and upon the consequent impediment) i.e., the caused, i.e., its relation to what is to come. And you are aware that this impediment, in reality, is caused by the emission, and that it is close to the attribute in its consequence, not that the consequence precedes it. And it is answered that it precedes it conceptually.
(قَوْلُهُ فَإِذَا ارْتَفَعَ أَحَدُهُمَا إلَخْ) أَيْ وَإِذَا ثَبَتَ أَحَدُهُمَا ثَبَتَ الْآخَرُ لَا يُقَالُ لَا نُسَلِّمُ أَنَّهُمَا مُتَلَازِمَانِ فَإِذَا ارْتَفَعَ أَحَدُهُمَا ارْتَفَعَ الْآخَرُ فَإِنَّ التَّيَمُّمَ يَرْفَعُ الْمَنْعَ؛ لِأَنَّهُ تُسْتَبَاحُ بِهِ الصَّلَاةُ وَغَيْرُهَا وَلَا يَرْفَعُ الْحَدَثَ بِمَعْنَى الْوَصْفِ الْقَائِمِ بِالْأَعْضَاءِ لِأَنَّ الْمَشْهُورَ أَنَّهُ لَا يَرْفَعُ الْحَدَثَ فَلَا تَلَازُمَ بَيْنَهُمَا؛ لِأَنَّا نَقُولُ التَّيَمُّمُ لَا يَرْفَعُ الْمَنْعَ رَفْعًا مُطْلَقًا وَإِنَّمَا هُوَ رُخْصَةٌ فَيَرْفَعُ الْمَنْعَ عَمَّا يُسْتَبَاحُ بِهِ عَلَى وَجْهٍ مَخْصُوصٍ، وَهُوَ عَدَمُ الْمَاءِ فَلَا تُسْتَبَاحُ بِهِ إلَّا فَرِيضَةٌ وَاحِدَةٌ فِي حَالِ عَدَمِ الْمَاءِ وَلَوْ وُجِدَ الْمَاءُ قَبْلَ فِعْلِ ذَلِكَ الْمُسْتَبَاحِ عَادَ الْمَنْعُ وَلَمْ يُسْتَبَحْ بِهِ شَيْءٌ أَفَادَ الْحَطَّابُ وَخُلَاصَتُهُ أَنَّ مَعْنَى تَلَازُمِهِمَا أَنَّهُ لَا يَرْتَفِعُ أَحَدُهُمَا دَائِمًا وَيَبْقَى الْآخَرُ دَائِمًا بَلْ إذَا ارْتَفَعَ الْمَنْعُ فَإِنَّمَا هُوَ مُقَيَّدٌ بِوَقْتٍ ثُمَّ يَعُودُ بَعْدَ ذَلِكَ الْوَقْتِ وَلَعَلَّ الْأَحْسَنَ أَنْ يُقَالَ أَنَّ كُلًّا
(His statement: So if one of them is lifted, etc.) i.e., and if one of them is established, the other is established. It should not be said: We do not concede that they are concomitant, such that if one is lifted, the other is lifted. For tayammum (dry ablution) lifts the impediment, because prayer and other things are made permissible by it, but it does not lift the ḥadath in the sense of the attribute subsisting in the limbs, because the well-known position is that it does not lift the ḥadath. Thus, there is no concomitance between them. Because we say: Tayammum does not lift the impediment in an absolute sense. Rather, it is a dispensation (rukhṣah), so it lifts the impediment from that which is made permissible by it in a specific manner, which is the absence of water. So only one obligatory prayer is made permissible by it in the state of the absence of water. And if water were found before performing that which was made permissible, the impediment would return and nothing would be made permissible by it. Al-Ḥaṭṭāb stated this. The summary is that the meaning of their concomitance is that one of them is not lifted permanently while the other remains permanently. Rather, if the impediment is lifted, it is only restricted to a time, then it returns after that time. And perhaps it is better to say that each…