الْأُولَيَيْنِ إذْ لَا يَرْتَفِعَانِ إلَّا بِتَقْدِيرِ مُضَافٍ أَيْ حُكْمُ الْحَدَثِ فَيَصِحُّ إرَادَتُهُمَا لَا يُقَالُ الْحَدَثُ هُوَ الْمَنْعُ الْمُتَرَتِّبُ إلَخْ وَالْمَنْعُ هُوَ حُكْمُ اللَّهِ تَعَالَى وَحُكْمُهُ قَدِيمٌ وَاجِبُ الْوُجُودِ فَكَيْفَ يُتَصَوَّرُ رَفْعُ وَاجِبِ الْوُجُودِ؛ لِأَنَّا نَقُولُ الْحُكْمُ مُرْتَفِعٌ وَمُتَجَدِّدٌ بِاعْتِبَارِ تَعَلُّقِهِ لَا بِاعْتِبَارِ ذَاتِهِ وَالتَّعَلُّقُ عَدَمِيٌّ مُمْكِنُ الِارْتِفَاعِ وَبَنَى الْمُؤَلِّفُ يُرْفَعُ لِلْمَجْهُولِ لِلْعِلْمِ بِفَاعِلِهِ، وَهُوَ اللَّهُ أَوْ النَّبِيُّ - عَلَيْهِ الصَّلَاةُ وَالسَّلَامُ - بِوَاسِطَةِ مَا أَوْحَى اللَّهُ إلَيْهِ لَا يُقَالُ قَوْلُهُ يُرْفَعُ الْأَوْلَى فِيهِ التَّعْبِيرُ بِالْمَاضِي؛ لِأَنَّ هَذَا أَمْرٌ ثَابِتٌ مُقَرَّرٌ عَنْ الشَّارِعِ أَيْ حَكَمَ بِصِحَّةِ رَفْعِ الْحَدَثِ وَحُكْمِ الْخَبَثِ؛ لِأَنَّا نَقُولُ إنَّمَا عَبَّرَ بِالْمُضَارِعِ لِلْإِشَارَةِ إلَى أَنَّهُ نَظَرَ فِيهِ إلَى حُكْمِ الْفَقِيهِ بِذَلِكَ فِي الْمُسْتَقْبَلِ وَلَوْ نَظَرَ إلَى مَا ثَبَتَ عَنْ الشَّارِعِ لَعَبَّرَ بِالْمَاضِي أَوْ أَنَّهُ عَبَّرَ بِالْمُضَارِعِ عَنْ الْمَاضِي عَلَى نَقِيضِ قَوْله تَعَالَى {أَتَى أَمْرُ اللَّهِ} [النحل: ١] نَظَرًا إلَى إحْضَارِ هَذَا الْحُكْمِ الْعَجِيبِ فِي ذِهْنِ السَّامِعِ أَيْ إحْضَارِهِ الْآنَ؛ لِأَنَّ الْمُضَارِعَ يُسْتَحْضَرُ بِهِ الْأُمُورُ الْغَرِيبَةُ بِخِلَافِ الْمَاضِي فَإِنَّهُ لَا إحْضَارَ فِيهِ وَالشَّيْءُ قَدْ يُحْمَلُ عَلَى نَقِيضِهِ كَمَا يُحْمَلُ عَلَى نَظِيرِهِ وَعَبَّرَ بِالْجُمْلَةِ الْفِعْلِيَّةِ وَلَمْ يُعَبِّرْ بِالْجُمْلَةِ الِاسْمِيَّةِ فَيَقُولُ رَافِعُ الْحَدَثِ وَحُكْمُ الْخَبَثِ الْمَاءُ الْمُطْلَقُ؛ لِأَنَّهَا تُفِيدُ التَّجَدُّدَ وَالْحُدُوثَ وَالْمَقْصُودُ هُنَا ذَلِكَ وَلِأَنَّ نِسْبَةَ الرَّفْعِ إلَى الْمَاءِ مَجَازٌ.
the first two, since they are not lifted except by positing a possessive term (mudaf), i.e., the ruling of hadath, so it is correct to intend them both. It is not said: hadath is the prevention that results, etc., and prevention is the ruling of Allah the Exalted, and His ruling is eternal, necessarily existent, so how can the lifting of that which is necessarily existent be conceived? Because we say: The ruling is lifted and renewed with respect to its attachment, not with respect to its essence. And the attachment is a non-existent matter, possible to be lifted. And the author constructed yurfa'u [is lifted] in the passive voice due to the knowledge of its doer, which is Allah or the Prophet—peace and blessings be upon him—by means of what Allah revealed to him. It is not said: Regarding his statement yurfa'u, it would be better to use the past tense, because this is an established, decided matter from the Lawgiver, i.e., He ruled on the validity of lifting hadath and the ruling of khabath. Because we say: He only used the present tense to indicate that he considered in it the ruling of the jurist (faqih) about that in the future. Had he considered what is established from the Lawgiver, he would have used the past tense. Or, that he used the present tense for the past, as the opposite of His, the Exalted’s, statement {The command of Allah has come} [An-Nahl: 1], in consideration of making this wondrous ruling present in the listener’s mind, i.e., making it present now, because the present tense is used to make strange matters present, unlike the past tense, in which there is no making-present. And a thing may be carried to its opposite just as it is carried to its analogue. And he expressed it with a verbal sentence and did not express it with a nominal sentence, saying: The lifter of hadath and the ruling of khabath is absolute water; because it [the verbal sentence] conveys renewal and occurrence, and that is what is intended here, and because the attribution of the lifting to water is metaphorical.
(ص) ، وَهُوَ مَا صَدَقَ عَلَيْهِ
(S), and it is that to which applies
ــ
–
[حاشية العدوي]
[Gloss of al-‘Adawi]
مِنْ الْوَصْفِ وَالْمَنْعِ يَرْتَفِعُ رَفْعًا مُقَيَّدًا وَقَوْلُهُمْ لَا يَرْفَعُ الْحَدَثَ أَيْ رَفْعًا مُطْلَقًا أُرِيدَ بِهِ الْحَدَثُ أَوْ الْمَنْعُ
from the description and the prevention, it is lifted with a restricted lifting. And their statement ‘it does not lift hadath’ means an absolute lifting, whether hadath or the prevention is intended by it.
(قَوْلُهُ إلَّا بِتَقْدِيرِ مُضَافٍ) أَيْ لَا يَصِحُّ إلَّا بِتَقْدِيرِ مُضَافٍ أَيْ حُكْمُ الْحَدَثِ الَّذِي هُوَ الْوَصْفُ أَوْ الْمَنْعُ ثُمَّ نَقُولُ وَلَا فَرْقَ بَيْنَ أَنْ يَكُونَ كُلٌّ تَرَتَّبَ عَنْ حَدَثٍ أَوْ سَبَبٍ أَوْ رِدَّةٍ أَوْ شَكٍّ
(His statement: except by positing a mudaf) i.e., it is not correct except by positing a mudaf, i.e., the ruling of the hadath, which is the description or the prevention. Then we say: and there is no difference whether each resulted from a hadath, or a cause, or apostasy, or doubt.
(قَوْلُهُ وَالْمَنْعُ هُوَ حُكْمُ اللَّهِ) ؛ لِأَنَّهُ تَحْرِيمُ قُرْبَانِ الْعِبَادَةِ
(His statement: and the prevention is the ruling of Allah); because it is the prohibition of approaching an act of worship.
(قَوْلُهُ وَاجِبُ الْوُجُودِ) أَتَى بِهِ دَفْعًا لِمَا يُتَوَهَّمُ أَنَّ الْمُرَادَ بِالْقَدِيمِ طَوِيلُ الزَّمَنِ فِيمَا مَضَى
(His statement: necessarily existent) He brought it to repel the notion that what is meant by qadim [eternal] is a long time in the past.
(قَوْلُهُ فَكَيْفَ يُتَصَوَّرُ إلَخْ) اسْتِفْهَامٌ إنْكَارِيٌّ
(His statement: so how can it be conceived, etc.) A rhetorical question of disapproval.
(قَوْلُهُ وَمُتَجَدِّدٌ) لَا دَخْلَ هُنَا، وَإِنْ كَانَ صَحِيحًا
(His statement: and renewed) It has no place here, even if it is correct.
(قَوْلُهُ بِاعْتِبَارِ تَعَلُّقِهِ) أَيْ أَنَّهُ فِي حَدِّ ذَاتِهِ لَيْسَ مُتَجَدِّدًا وَمُرْتَفِعًا بَلْ مَا مُرْتَفِعٌ وَمُتَجَدِّدٌ إلَّا تَعَلُّقُهُ
(His statement: with respect to its attachment) i.e., that in its very essence it is not renewed and lifted; rather, what is lifted and renewed is only its attachment.
(قَوْلُهُ عَدَمِيٌّ) أَيْ لَيْسَ لَهُ وُجُودٌ فِي الْخَارِجِ فَلَا يُنَافِي أَنَّهُ أَمْرٌ اعْتِبَارِيٌّ وَالْوَاوُ فِي قَوْلِهِ وَالتَّعَلُّقُ لِلتَّعْلِيلِ أَيْ؛ لِأَنَّهُ عَدَمِيٌّ، وَأَمَّا لَوْ كَانَ وُجُودِيًّا فَلَا يَصِحُّ رَفْعُهُ؛ لِأَنَّهُ يَلْزَمُ أَنْ يَكُونَ قَدِيمًا عَلَى فَرْضِ ذَلِكَ؛ لِأَنَّ صِفَةَ الْقَدِيمِ الْوُجُودِيَّةَ قَدِيمَةٌ فَتَدَبَّرْ، ثُمَّ لَا يَخْفَى أَنَّ هَذَا كُلُّهُ بِنَاءً عَلَى أَنَّ التَّعَلُّقَ لَيْسَ جُزْءًا مِنْ مُسَمَّى الْحُكْمِ.
(His statement: non-existent) i.e., it has no existence externally, so this does not contradict it being a conceptual matter. And the waw in his statement “and the attachment” is for causation, i.e., because it is non-existent. As for if it were existential, its lifting would not be correct, because it would necessarily be eternal on that assumption, for an existential attribute of the Eternal is eternal. So reflect. Then, it is not hidden that all of this is based on the premise that the attachment is not part of the definition of the ruling.
وَأَمَّا إذَا قُلْنَا أَنَّ التَّعَلُّقَ جُزْءُ مُسَمَّى الْحُكْمِ فَيَكُونُ الْحُكْمُ هُوَ كَلَامُ اللَّهِ الْمُتَعَلِّقُ تَعَلُّقًا تَنْجِيزِيًّا حَادِثًا بِأَفْعَالِ الْمُكَلَّفِينَ فَيَكُونُ حَادِثًا؛ لِأَنَّ الْمُرَكَّبَ مِنْ الْقَدِيمِ وَالْحَادِثِ حَادِثٌ فَلَا مَحْذُورَ فِي كَوْنِهِ يَتَجَدَّدُ وَيَرْتَفِعُ
But if we say that the attachment is part of the definition of the ruling, then the ruling would be the speech of Allah that has a contingent, effective attachment to the actions of the legally responsible, so it would be contingent, because that which is composed of the eternal and the contingent is contingent. Thus, there is no problem in its being renewed and lifted.
(قَوْلُهُ، وَهُوَ اللَّهُ أَوْ النَّبِيُّ إلَخْ) الْأَحْسَنُ أَنْ يُقَالَ إنَّ الْفَاعِلَ هُوَ الْمُكَلَّفُ؛ لِأَنَّ الْمُرَادَ بِالْفَاعِلِ فِي ذَلِكَ الْمَقَامِ مَنْ قَامَ بِهِ الْفِعْلُ لَا مَنْ أَوْجَدَهُ فَلَا يَرِدُ مَا يَأْتِي إذْ لَوْ أُرِيدَ الْمُوجِدُ لَمَا صَحَّ إسْنَادُ فِعْلٍ إلَى أَحَدٍ غَيْرِهِ حَقِيقَةً إلَّا أَنَّك خَبِيرٌ بِأَنَّ قَوْلَهُ بَعْدُ أَيْ حُكْمٌ إلَخْ يُؤْذِنُ بِأَنَّ الْمُرَادَ بِقَوْلِهِ بِفَاعِلِهِ أَيْ بِحَاكِمِهِ أَيْ بِالْحَاكِمِ بِهِ
(His statement: which is Allah or the Prophet, etc.) It is better to say that the doer is the legally responsible person, because what is meant by the doer in this context is the one by whom the action is performed, not the one who brought it into existence. Thus, what follows does not apply, since if the originator were intended, it would not be correct to attribute an action to anyone other than Him in reality. However, you are aware that his later statement, i.e., “a ruling, etc.,” indicates that what is meant by his statement “its doer” is “its ruler,” i.e., the one who rules by it.
(قَوْلُهُ بِوَاسِطَةِ) أَيْ بِوَاسِطَةٍ هِيَ الْأَحْكَامُ الَّتِي أَوْحَاهَا اللَّهُ إلَيْهِ أَوْ بِوَاسِطَةِ الْإِيحَاءِ
(His statement: by means of) i.e., by a means which is the rulings that Allah revealed to him, or by means of the revelation.
(قَوْلُهُ الشَّارِعِ) أَيْ الَّذِي هُوَ اللَّهُ تَعَالَى حَقِيقَةً وَالنَّبِيُّ - صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ - مَجَازًا
(His statement: the Lawgiver) i.e., who is Allah the Exalted in reality, and the Prophet—may Allah bless him and grant him peace—metaphorically.
(قَوْلُهُ أَيْ حَكَمَ بِصِحَّةِ رَفْعِ إلَخْ) لَا يَخْفَى أَنَّ هَذَا لَيْسَ تَفْسِيرًا لِلَّفْظِ بِمَدْلُولِهِ فَهُوَ بَعِيدٌ غَايَةَ الْبُعْدِ وَالْأَقْرَبُ مَا قُلْنَا وَالْحُكْمُ بِاعْتِبَارِ إسْنَادِهِ إلَى اللَّهِ أَزَلِيٌّ وَبِالنِّسْبَةِ لِلنَّبِيِّ - صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ - حَادِثٌ
(His statement: i.e., He ruled on the validity of lifting, etc.) It is not hidden that this is not an explanation of the word by its meaning; it is extremely far-fetched. What we said is closer. And the ruling, with respect to its attribution to Allah, is pre-eternal, and with respect to the Prophet—may Allah bless him and grant him peace—it is contingent.
(قَوْلُهُ نَظَرَ فِيهِ إلَى حُكْمِ الْفَقِيهِ) أَيْ إخْبَارِهِ
(His statement: he considered in it the ruling of the jurist) i.e., his informing.
(قَوْلُهُ إلَى إحْضَارِ هَذَا الْحُكْمِ) أَيْ الَّذِي هُوَ الْحُكْمُ بِصِحَّةِ الرَّفْعِ وَإِنَّمَا كَانَ عَجِيبًا لِغَرَابَتِهِ؛ لِأَنَّ ذَلِكَ لَمْ يَكُنْ مَعْهُودًا
(His statement: of making this ruling present) i.e., which is the ruling on the validity of lifting. And it was only wondrous because of its strangeness, because that was not previously known.
(قَوْلُهُ أَيْ إحْضَارُهُ إلَخْ) خُلَاصَتُهُ أَنَّ الْمُصَنِّفَ أَرَادَ أَنْ يَجْعَلَ هَذَا الْحُكْمَ الْعَجِيبَ حَاضِرًا فِي ذِهْنِ السَّامِعِ وَالطَّرِيقُ الَّتِي تُوَصِّلُ لِذَلِكَ إنَّمَا هِيَ الْمُضَارِعُ، وَأَمَّا الْمَاضِي فَلَا فَلِذَلِكَ عَبَّرَ بِالْمُضَارِعِ.
(His statement: i.e., making it present, etc.) Its summary is that the author wanted to make this wondrous ruling present in the listener’s mind, and the way that leads to that is only the present tense. As for the past tense, no, and that is why he used the present tense.
(قَوْلُهُ بِخِلَافِ الْمَاضِي فَإِنَّهُ لَا إحْضَارَ فِيهِ) أَيْ لَا يَتَيَسَّرُ أَنْ يَكُونَ آلَةً فِي إحْضَارِ ذَلِكَ فِي ذِهْنِ السَّامِعِ هَذَا مَعْنَاهُ
(His statement: unlike the past tense, in which there is no making-present) i.e., it is not possible for it to be a tool for making that present in the listener’s mind. This is its meaning.
(أَقُولُ) لَا يَخْفَى لَوْ عَبَّرَ بِالْمَاضِي وَأَخْبَرَ بِهِ السَّامِعَ فَإِنَّهُ يَتَصَوَّرُهُ فِي ذِهْنِهِ قَطْعًا، وَهَذَا إحْضَارٌ لَهُ فِي ذِهْنِ السَّامِعِ فَقَدْ حَصَلَ الْإِحْضَارُ بِالْمَاضِي وَيُمْكِنُ الْجَوَابُ أَنَّ مُرَادَهُ إحْضَارٌ بِحَيْثُ يُلَاحِظُ أَنَّهُ وَاقِعٌ فِي الْحَالِ لَا مُطْلَقُ إحْضَارٍ
(I say) It is not hidden that if he had used the past tense and informed the listener with it, he would certainly conceive of it in his mind, and this is a making-present of it in the listener’s mind. So, the making-present has been achieved with the past tense. And it is possible to answer that what he means is a making-present such that one observes that it is occurring in the present, not just any making-present.
(قَوْلُهُ وَالشَّيْءُ قَدْ يُحْمَلُ عَلَى نَقِيضِهِ) كَمَا هُنَا
(His statement: And a thing may be carried to its opposite) As is the case here.
(قَوْلُهُ كَمَا يُحْمَلُ عَلَى نَظِيرِهِ) كَمَا هُوَ مَعْلُومٌ فِي بَابِ الْقِيَاسِ كَحَمْلِ الْأَرُزِّ عَلَى الْبُرِّ فِي حُرْمَةِ الرِّبَا بِجَامِعِ الِاقْتِيَاتِ وَالِادِّخَارِ وَكَمَا هُوَ مَعْلُومٌ فِي الْمَجَازَاتِ مَثَلًا اسْتِعْمَالُ السَّبَبِ فِي الْمُسَبَّبِ يَكْفِي وُرُودُهُ عَنْ الْعَرَبِ فِي جُزْئِيٍّ وَيَجُوزُ لَنَا أَنْ نَسْتَعْمِلَ اسْمَ السَّبَبِ فِي جُزْئِيٍّ غَيْرَ مَا اسْتَعْمَلَتْهُ الْعَرَبُ لِمَا تَقَرَّرَ أَنَّ الْمَجَازَ مَوْضُوعٌ بِالنَّوْعِ فَتَدَبَّرْ
(His statement: just as it is carried to its analogue) As is known in the chapter of analogy (qiyas), like analogizing rice to wheat in the prohibition of riba based on the common factor of being a staple food and being storable. And as is known in metaphors, for example, the use of the cause for the effect; its occurrence from the Arabs in a particular instance is sufficient, and it is permissible for us to use the name of the cause for a particular instance other than what the Arabs used, because of what is established that metaphor is established by type. So reflect.
(قَوْلُهُ التَّجَدُّدَ وَالْحُدُوثَ) أَيْ شَيْئًا بَعْدَ شَيْءٍ الَّذِي يَدُلُّ عَلَيْهِ الْمُضَارِعُ بِالْقَرِينَةِ لَا الْوُجُودِ بَعْدَ الْعَدَمِ الَّذِي يَكُونُ فِي الْفِعْلِ مُطْلَقًا وَلَا يَتَوَقَّفُ عَلَى قَرِينَةٍ، وَأَمَّا الْجُمْلَةُ الِاسْمِيَّةُ فَتُفِيدُ الدَّوَامَ وَالثَّبَاتَ بِقَرِينَةٍ أَيْضًا لَكِنَّهُ لَيْسَ مُرَادًا
(His statement: renewal and occurrence) i.e., thing after thing, which the present tense indicates with context, not existence after non-existence, which is in the verb absolutely and does not depend on context. As for the nominal sentence, it conveys permanence and stability, also with context, but that is not what is intended.
(قَوْلُهُ وَالْمَقْصُودُ هُنَا ذَلِكَ) فِيهِ أَنَّهُ قَدْ تَقَدَّمَ لَهُ أَنَّ الرَّفْعَ قَدِيمٌ فَقَضِيَّتُهُ أَنْ لَا يَكُونَ الْمَعْنَى عَلَى التَّجَدُّدِ وَالْحُدُوثِ فَيُجَابُ بِأَنَّ هَذَا نَاظِرٌ لِمَا تَقَدَّمَ مَنْقُولُهُ أَوْ نَظَرًا لِحُكْمِ الْفَقِيهِ بِذَلِكَ نَعَمْ هَذَا الْكَلَامُ ظَاهِرٌ عَلَى مَا قُلْنَا أَنَّ الرَّافِعَ الْمُكَلَّفُ فَافْهَمْ
(His statement: and what is intended here is that) In it is [the issue] that it was previously stated by him that the lifting is eternal, the implication of which is that the meaning should not be renewal and occurrence. It may be answered that this is considering what he previously quoted, or in consideration of the jurist’s ruling on that. Yes, this statement is clear according to what we said, that the one who lifts is the legally responsible person. So understand.
(قَوْلُهُ وَلِأَنَّ نِسْبَةَ الرَّفْعِ إلَى الْمَاءِ مَجَازٌ) أَيْ الَّذِي يَأْتِي عَلَى التَّعْبِيرِ بِالْجُمْلَةِ الِاسْمِيَّةِ، وَأَمَّا الْفِعْلِيَّةُ فَلَا يَأْتِي ذَلِكَ عَلَيْهَا لَكِنْ يَرِدُ أَنَّ الْمَجَازَ أَبْلَغُ مِنْ الْحَقِيقَةِ.
(His statement: and because the attribution of the lifting to water is metaphorical) i.e., which comes with the expression of the nominal sentence. As for the verbal one, that does not come upon it. But the objection arises that metaphor is more eloquent than literal truth.
(قَوْلُهُ مَا صَدَقَ) أَيْ الَّذِي صَدَقَ أَوْ شَيْءٌ صَدَقَ أَوْ يُقْرَأُ مَاءٌ بِالتَّنْوِينِ
(His statement: ma sadaqa) i.e., “that which applied” or “a thing which applied,” or it is read ma'un with tanwin.
(قَوْلُهُ صَدَقَ) أَيْ حُمِلَ؛ لِأَنَّ الصِّدْقَ فِي الْمُفْرَدَاتِ مَعْنَاهُ الْحَمْلُ وَفِي الْقَضَايَا بِمَعْنَى التَّحَقُّقِ أَيْ مَا صَحَّ أَنْ يُحْمَلَ عَلَيْهِ أَيْ عُرْفًا كَمَا أَفَادَهُ الْحَطَّابُ وَفِي كَلَامِ تت مَا يُفِيدُ أَنَّ الْمُرَادَ مَا صَحَّ لُغَةً مَثَلًا مَاءُ الْبِطِّيخِ لَا يُطْلَقُ عَلَيْهِ عُرْفًا مَاءٌ مِنْ غَيْرِ قَيْدٍ عَلَى مَا قَالَ الْحَطَّابُ وَهَلْ يَصِحُّ إطْلَاقُ ذَلِكَ عَلَيْهِ لُغَةً، وَهُوَ الْمُتَبَادِرُ إذْ الْأَصْلُ اخْتِلَافُ الْمَعْنَى اللُّغَوِيِّ وَالْعُرْفِيِّ، وَأَمَّا عَلَى مَا قَالَ تت فَلَا يَصِحُّ إطْلَاقُ ذَلِكَ عَلَيْهِ لُغَةً وَصِحَّةُ هَذَا تَتَوَقَّفُ عَلَى ثُبُوتِ ذَلِكَ لُغَةً كَذَا فِي ك قَالَ عج ثُمَّ رَأَيْت فِي الْفَتَاوَى السُّيُوطِيَّةِ مَا يُوَافِقُ مَا ذَكَرَهُ
(His statement: sadaqa [applied]) i.e., was predicated, because sidq for single terms means predication, and for propositions it means realization. i.e., that which can validly be predicated of it, i.e., customarily, as al-Hattab stated. And in the words of “tt” is that which indicates that what is meant is what is correct linguistically. For example, watermelon juice is not customarily called “water” without a qualifier, according to what al-Hattab said. And is it correct to call it that linguistically? This is what comes to mind, since the default is a difference between the linguistic and customary meaning. But according to what “tt” said, it is not correct to call it that linguistically, and the correctness of this depends on the establishment of that linguistically. Thus in “k”. “Aj” said: Then I saw in the Fatawa of al-Suyuti that which agrees with what he mentioned.